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JURISDICTION AND NATURF s* 
Utah Supreme Couit jurisdiction : > appeal 6"lse: 
under v provisions • o* * • ** - * * c - . - - * •-
Thi s .i;,p * * * * Arthur L. 
Monson . Milton Yorgasonf (hereinaf- J . > - * : V « - , referred 
to as "the County*" an uidei ui m c lax uivis 
Th urt - Judge Timothy R. Hansoi 
granted plaintiff, Kennecott Corporation ("Kennecott11 i, summary 
judgment JI UU Laube ui " mi tin- ' DL' I j ',s r ounterclaim 
aga;: .--ennecott . dismissing tha . w^ - -claim with prejudice. 
The County Is appealing Judge Hansor i- ;• ;er w * granted 
s u m m a r .. -: -; ~\ *• r\ • , > ^  . Comm i s -
sion"), on the County's crossclaim against the Commission, dis-
missing that crossclaim * *x ; rejudice. 
moucht hv Kennecott against 
the Count . •„-./• * .- A V 59-1 ;4.. (Supp. 1987), for-
merly ljta- c -c- \ .11. ^ ji-j.i-11, 1953 a* - . - - f • 
er> ( 1 Ldxei. paid under protest *ennecott . ?5.. 
Kennecott's original case iii chief was resolved by Rio Alqom 
Corp. v. San Juai i Count yf 681 • • • - 11 oving 
that resolution, there remained t\ le County"^ counterclaim against 
Kennecott and the County ,? rossclaim against the Commission. 
STATEMENT -ISUES PRESENTED \*OH ifEV 1EI 
1
 \ the County obtain additional taxes from 
Kennecott because of an alleged underassessment oi nennec ot .t ' s 
centrally assessed property when that property has neither 
escaped assessment, nor been omitted from assessment, for the 
years in question? 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17, 1953 as amended, 
now codified at S 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987), permit the County to 
force an assessment of Kennecott's centrally assessed property by 
the Commission due to an alleged underassessment? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In May of 1982 Kennecott brought an action against the 
County in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-11-11, 1953 as amended, now codified at Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-2-1411 (Supp. 1987). (Rec. 2-8). In that action, Kennecott 
alleged it had been required to pay illegal, excessive and 
unconstitutional taxes as a result of the enactment and implemen-
tation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5, 1953 as amended. 
The County counterclaimed against Kennecott alleging 
that Kennecott's property was underassessed in 1981 and for four 
years prior thereto. (Rec. 53-57). The County alleged that 
because of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17, supraf it should be permit-
ted to have Kennecott's property reassessed for these five years 
and to collect taxes based upon the reassessed value. (Rec. 
56-57). 
The County also crossclaimed against the Commission, 
asking that the Commission be required to value Kennecott's 
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I - ;.*.'-: to 
disregard the net annual proceeds assessment procedure mandated 
by the Utah Legislature in titan Code Am i. 3 3r* 
a 11 ended , (Rei: 57- M I • 
Kennecott • - • * chief agains 4 the county was 
resolved tr^  - rc.o Aigom Corp, v. San Juan 
County ?~- . Rio Alqom this court spe-
cifically held that Utah Code A . r«-~ ; • 1953 as amended, 
was v" • * * :-.: ."ates 
Constitutions. there remained only the County's Counter-
claim a: ;: Crossclaim for resolution, 
i ineco11 and 11 1 e Corun 11 ssio 1 1 thereafter brought Motions 
for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the County's Coun-
terclaim and Crossclaim. (Rec. 725-727 f 742- 744) The County 
r e s pu J' 1 el e d w ,11 h a Mo t ion for Summa ry Judgment, along with s uppo r t -
ing affidavits and submissions. (Rec. 771-86"7). On November 26
 f 
1986, tuc uistrici .ment s '," 11 Ke 11 neco1.1. " s and the 
Commission'^ M n f j r ^ f0,r Judgment on the Pleadings, on the 
County's M o t i c - Summary Judgment and Kennecott's and the 
Commission * ^ • . - .11 f 1 dav J t L- and 1 Dther 
documents submitte. ,- suppor: c: - :.- County s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. -*-. 1 , 
f 1 y a 1 gurne 1 11 for ove 1 t * o and one-haIf hours, 
the D i s t r I c t Co u r t denied the County's Mo t i o n f o r J udgme n t o ~. t - .* 
pleadings, granted Kennecott* s and the Commiss i<"i' \- * 
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Strike the County's Affidavits and other submissions, and granted 
Kennecott Summary Judgment, no cause of action, on the County's 
counterclaim, dismissing that counterclaim with prejudice, (Rec. 
1005-1013). The District Court also granted Summary Judgment to 
the Commission on the County's crossclaim, dismissing that 
crossclaim with prejudice. (Rec. 1004, 1013). 
In his decision and ruling, Judge Hanson specifically 
held: 
. . . that the net proceeds method of assess-
ing metalliferous mines and mining claims, 
including Kennecott's mines and mining 
claims, as set out in Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-5-57 et. seq., 1953, as amended, is con-
stitutional. (Rec. 1009-1010) . 
. . . that Salt Lake County's counterclaim 
against Kennecott is an attempt to apply the 
provisions of Utah's escaped assessment stat-
ute found at Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17 (1974), 
to property which Salt Lake County alleges 
was underassessed by the Utah State Tax Com-
mission for 1981 and years prior thereto. 
The Court rules that this attempt is improper 
in that underassessment is not, and does not 
constitute grounds for, escaped assessment. 
(Rec. 1011) 
The County has appealed the District Court's order 
granting Kennecott and the Commission Summary Judgment on the 
County's counterclaim and crossclaim, respectively. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The County asserts in its counterclaim that Kennecott's 
property which is assessed by the Commission was undervalued and 
underassessed in 1981 and for four years prior thereto. (Rec. 
53-57). There is no allegation that any of Kennecott's property 
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was not listed for assessment, i .e. was omitted from assessment 
by the Commission, or that part or all of Kennecott's property 
somehow escaped assessment. (Rec. 53-64). The allegations are 
that the method of assessment which was applied by the Commission 
resulted in underassessment and undervaluation. (Rec. 54-55, 
58-60). 
The County presented no admissible evidence of any 
escaped or omitted Kennecott property in response to Kennecott's 
motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in support of the 
County's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rec. 785-867, 1007-1009). 
The only response by the County to Kennecott's Motion for Judg-
ment on the Pleadings was an assertion that the methods employed 
by the Commission to assess Kennecott's property resulted in 
undervaluation. (Rec. 774-783). 
Part of this undervaluation argument was that use of 
the constitutionally and statutorily mandated net proceeds method 
of valuing metalliferous mines and mining claims resulted in 
undervaluation of Kennecott's mine. (Rec. 778-779). The County 
has never alleged or presented any evidence to demonstrate that 
the Commission or Kennecott did not properly value Kennecott's 
mine and mining claims under the net proceeds valuation formula 
set out in Article XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and 
in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57 et seg, 1953 as amended. (Rec. 
54-67, 773-784). Furthermore, the record contains no allegation 
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of, or evidence of, improper, fraudulent, or collusive assessment 
of Kennecott's property by the Commission, (Rec. 54-67), 
The County's only complaint is that the assessment by 
the Commission of Kennecott's property did not produce the tax 
"revenue the County believes it needs or should receive, and, as a 
consequence, Kennecott's property must have been undervalued. 
(Rec. 56-57, 60-61, 64). 
The record contains no allegations, or evidence, that 
the County sought to have Kennecott's property revalued by the 
Commission when the County received notice of Kennecott's assess-
ment from the Commission in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 or 1981. Only 
after Kennecott filed its tax protest action to recover a portion 
of the taxes it paid the County did the County allege that it 
should receive more taxes from Kennecott, because Kennecott's 
property was undervalued and underassessed in 1981 and for the 
preceding four years. (Rec. 53-67). 
In pressing this appeal and in arguing its position, 
the County has relied heavily in its brief upon material which 
was stricken by the lower court and which also was stricken from 
the Addendums to the County's brief by this court. None of this 
material is in evidence. The state of the record presents only 
two issues for decision by this court. Those issues are whether 
or not the County has stated a cause of action when it alleges in 
its counterclaim that Kennecott's property which is purportedly 
undervalued is property which has "escaped assessment" to the 
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extent of the alleged undervaluation, and whether or not the 
County has authority to have Kennecott1s property reassessed when 
that assessment is committed to the Commission by the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah and Utah statute, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The County has no authority to recover additional taxes 
from Kennecott for 1981 and four years prior thereto under Utah 
Code Ann, S 59-5-17, supra, because of an alleged undervaluation 
or underassessment of Kennecott's property by the Commission. 
The County may notr under the procedure and guise of a 
Counterclaim or a Crossclaim in a Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-1411 
(Supp. 1987) tax protest action, obtain a reassessment or revalu-
ation of Kennecottfs property by the Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COUNTY MAY NOT RECOVER TAXES FROM 
KENNECOTT IN THIS ACTION BY VIRTUE OF UTAH'S 
ESCAPED ASSESSMENT STATUTE 
A. Utah's Escaped Assessment Statute Does Not 
Apply to Property Which is Allegedly 
Undervalued. 
As is pointed out above, the County relies upon Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-5-17 (1974), now found at Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987), in asserting its counterclaim. That 
statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows: 
Any property discovered by the assessor to 
have escaped assessment may be assessed at 
any time as far back as five years prior to 
the time of discovery, and the assessor shall 
enter such assessments on the tax rolls in 
-7-
the hands of the county treasurer or else-
where . . . 
Id. This statute does not define "escaped assessment" or specify 
what property is deemed to have escaped assessment. This court 
has on two occasions examined this escaped assessment statute, 
first in Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 65 Utah 335, 
230 P. 1020 (Utah 1924), and again in Builders Component Supply 
Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 (1969). In 1985, 
the Commission applied the statute in Nupetco Associates v. 
County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Appeal No, 
84-18-1600. A copy of the Commission's decision in Nupetco Asso-
ciates is attached as Addendum A to this brief. (Rec. 737-740). 
In Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, supra, 
this court applied Laws of Utah 1917 S 5908, the predecessor 
statute to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17, supra. The plaintiff in 
Union Portland failed to report all of its property in its annual 
statement to the State Board of Equalization. Id. at 1020. The 
omitted property was later assessed in a tax levy. Id. This 
court held as follows: 
Our statute which clearly indicates that, if 
for any reason, property is omitted from the 
assessment roll, or has not been assessed in 
the regular order or at the time contemplated 
by law, it shall nevertheless be assessed. 
Comp. Laws of Utah 1917 S 5908. . . . 
Id. at 1022. It is "the duty of the local assessor to assess 
property not listed for taxation . . . " Id. This language by 
the Utah Supreme Court shows that only property omitted from the 
-8-
tax rolls, or which has not been "listed for taxation," has 
escaped assessment. 
The court in Builders Component Supply Co, v. Cockayne, 
22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 (1969), construed the current Utah 
escaped assessment statute. All tax statutes, according to the 
court, should be "construed favorably to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority." 450 P.2d at 99. The 
court determined that where "there has never been a previous 
assessment [of plaintiff's property] and [plaintiff] had paid no 
taxes thereon" the statute imposed a duty upon the assessor to 
tax the property. Id. In reaching this conclusion the court 
states: "that where a valid assessment has been made by an 
assessor cognizant of the facts, undervaluation is ordinarily not 
a ground for another assessment; and that property should not be 
subject to double taxation." Jd.
 f 450 P.2d at 98. Only under 
extraordinary circumstances is undervaluation grounds for reas-
sessment. The court in Builders Component Supply followed the 
decision in Union Portland Cementf stating that only property 
which was not assessed for taxes at all has escaped assessment 
and become subject to the escaped assessment statute. 
The Commission cites Builders Component Supply and 
Union Portland Cement in its decision in the Nupetco Associates 
v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Addendum A 
to this brief. In Nupetco, three acres of petitioner's property 
were not taxed due to a clerical error. Id. The Commission 
-9-
states in its conclusions of law that "property which has been 
undervalued due to a clerical mistake in the quantity of the 
property to be assessed or in the assessed valuation does not 
result in property which has escaped valuation." id. (citations 
omitted). "The subject property did not escape assessment . . . 
but was undervalued,n so the Salt Lake County Assessor was said 
to have acted improperly in reassessing the property. Id. at 
page 6. 
The County does not claim that any of Kennecott's prop-
erty was deleted or omitted from assessment. The County's coun-
terclaim in this action states that Kennecott's property escaped 
assessment because it was "underassessed by the State Tax Commis-
sion of Utah." Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 
451, 453 (Utah 1985). Salt Lake County's Counterclaim at H 4. 
(Rec. 54). This assertion by the County is denied by Kennecott. 
However, assuming only for purposes of this appeal that 
underassessment in fact occurred, this does not present a claim 
for relief by the County. The decisions in Builders Component 
Supply and Nupetco specifically state that undervaluation is not 
sufficient grounds for reassessment. Under Union Portland Cement 
and Builders Component Supply the assessor's duty to assess 
escaped property arises only when that property is omitted or has 
never been assessed. 
-10-
B. The Majority Rule in Other Jurisdictions 
Would Not Permit Recovery in this Action by 
the County Under the County's Counterclaim, 
Utah's escaped assessment statute is similar to that 
found in many states. The majority rule in construing those 
statutes is that property is not open to reassessment as escaped 
property simply because it was undervalued. See State v. Realty 
Loan Company, 96 So. 613 (Ala. 1923); Thomas Executrix v. Common-
wealth, 215 S.W. 2d 546 (Ky. 1948); Davidson v. Franklin Avenue 
Investment Company, 151 N.W. 537 (Minn. 1915); Stafford v. River-
side County, 155 Cal.2d 474, 318 P.2d 172 (Ca. 1957); E.K. Wood 
Lumber Co. v. Whatcom County, 5 Wsh.2d 63, 104 P.2d 752 (1940). 
The Minnesota and Washington escaped assessment statutes use 
"omitted" to describe property subject to further assessment. 
Davidson, supra at 538; Tacoma Goodwill Industries Rehabilitation 
Center, Inc. v. County of Pearce, 518 P.2d 196, 197 (Wa. App. 
1973). Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17, supra, does not contain this 
"omitted" language, and thus more closer resembles the California 
statute. Stafford, 318 P.2d at 174. 
In Stafford, the court relied on the precedent set in 
Davidson and E.K. Wood Lumber Co., as well as cases from North 
Dakota, Alabama, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Illinois, when it ruled 
"it is only where there has been no assessment at all that the 
provisions for escape assessment apply." Id. at 174. Stafford 
was qualified by the California Supreme Court in Bauer-Schweitzer 
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Malting Company v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Cal. 
643, 506 P.2d 1019 (1973). 
In Bauer-Schweitzer the city and county assessor was 
charged with criminal misconduct while in office. Id. at 1020. 
The court upheld an order which allowed properties underassessed 
due to the assessor's criminal conduct to be reassessed by 
experts. id. at 1021. The holding expanded the definition of 
property which has escaped assessment to include property 
"assessed at an assessment ratio lower than the ratio properly 
established by the assessor for a particular year . . . ." Id. 
at 1022. An assessor's criminal conduct is an extraordinary cir-
cumstance, which was contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Builders Component Supply, supra, when the court indicated that 
an extraordinary circumstance constitutes sufficient grounds for 
a second assessment of the property. Builders Component Supply, 
supra, at 98. 
Because Utah follows the rule that property which is 
underassessed is not the same as property which has escaped 
assessment, Kennecott's property may not be reassessed, and the 
County cannot recover on its Counterclaim. 
C. The County is Not the Assessor of Kennecott's 
Property and Cannot have Kennecott's Property 
Reassessed as Property Which has Escaped 
Assessment. 
Utah Code Annotated S 59-5-46(22), (1974), clearly com-
mits to the Commission the power and authority to correct any 
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assessment made by it when that assessment is improper. It 
states as follows: 
To correct any error in any assessment made 
by it at any time before the tax is paid 
thereon and report such correction to the 
county auditor, who shall thereupon enter the 
same upon the assessment roll. 
Nowhere in Utah statute is the county assessor given 
any authority whatsoever to correct any assessment made by the 
Commission upon property which, by statute and the constitution, 
the Commission is required to assess. Kennecott's property is 
mining property and as such it is assessed under the Utah Consti-
tution and Utah Statute by the Commission. The County Assessor 
has no authority to assess Kennecott's property. As a result, 
any erroneous assessment can only be corrected by the original 
assessor, i.e. the Commission, and may not be corrected by the 
county assessor. Thus, Utah Code Annotated S 59-5-17, supra, 
granting authority to the County Assessor to assess property 
which has escaped assessment as far back as five years prior to 
the time of discovery, does not apply so as to permit the County, 
or the County Assessor, to have Kennecott's property reassessed. 
The only body which may correct an assessment, or which 
may require property which has escaped assessment to be assessed, 
is the Commission. The County simply does not have the authority 
to have Kennecott's property reassessed in this case, as the 
County is not the assessor. Furthermore, Utah statutory lav 
clearly states that any assessment made by the Commission may not 
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be changed by the County. In Utah Code Annotated S 59-2-802 
(Supp. 1987), it states as follows: 
The commission shall, before June 1, transmit 
to the county auditor of each county in which 
an apportionment has been made a statement 
showing the property assessed and the 
assessed value of the property, as fixed and 
apportioned to the county, cities, towns, 
schools, and other taxing districts. The 
county auditor shall enter the statement on 
the assessment roll or book of the county, 
and enter the amount of the assessment appor-
tioned to the county in the column of the 
assessment book or roll which shows the total 
value of all property for taxation of the 
county. No county governing body, acting as 
a county board of equalization, may change 
any assessment fixed by the commission. 
Thus, the County's attempt to use Utah's escaped 
assessment statute to reassess Kennecott's property, which prop-
erty has been assessed by the Commission, is improper and cannot 
be allowed. 
D« Sound Public Policy Dictates That, Absent 
Extraordinary Circumstances, Utah's Escaped 
Assessment Statute Should Be Held Inapplica-
ble To Underassessed Property. 
There are sound policy reasons for holding that Utah's 
escaped assessment statute should not apply to property which is 
only allegedly undervalued, but upon which the taxpayer has paid 
his taxes, and closed his books. The taxpayer in this proceed-
ing, Kennecott, received its assessment from the Commission in 
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981, and did not protest or seek to 
have that assessment changed under the Commission equalization 
procedures found at Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-12 et seg., 1953 as 
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amended, now codified at S 59-2-1013 (Supp. 1987). Kennecott 
paid its taxes to the County based upon the assessment, and the 
County accepted that payment based upon that same assessment. 
Kennecott is entitled to an assurance that its acceptance of the 
Commissions assessment, and its payment of taxes based upon that 
acceptance, will end any obligation for taxes in those years it 
did not protest its assessment before the Commission under Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-7-12, supra. Both Kennecott and the Commission 
are also entitled to the assurance that the Commission's assess-
ment is final unless the County protests that assessment under 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-12, supra. 
A policy of finality in taxation matters, and the 
administrative and financial nightmare which ensues without such 
a policy, is what led this court to give prospective effect to 
its holding that Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-109, 1953 as amended, was 
unconstitutional in Rio Alqom v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 
196 (Utah 1984). That same policy of finality, coupled with 
reliance upon the taxpayer's part, was the reason this court's 
holding in Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Bd.
 f 659 P.2d 
257 (Utah 1982), was given only prospective effect. In Moose the 
court states: 
Also, if the rule were to be given retroac-
tive effect, the assessment of back taxes on 
properties affected by this rule might well 
result in an unreasonable burden upon all 
those organizations and governmental bodies 
associated with it. By staying the effective 
date of our ruling in this case, not only are 
court and agency resources saved, but time 
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also is allowed for organizations affected to 
make needed adjustments. 
This correction of a misinterpreted line 
of law should not and shall not work harshly 
against the appellant here. 
657 P.2d at 265. 
For the same policy and hardship reasons enunciated in 
both Rio Alqom and Moose, this court should hold that, absent 
extraordinary or unusual circumstances, Utah's escaped assessment 
statute, Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987), does not apply 
to underassessed, as opposed to omitted, property. In this case 
to hold otherwise will reopen the assessment of Kennecott's prop-
erty for as far back as 1977, ten years ago. Under these circum-
stances no taxpayer can ever be assured his responsibility for 
payment of taxes has ended when his taxes are paid. This will 
create uncertainty upon the part of governments, the Commission 
and taxpayers and may well work a hardship upon, and work harshly 
against, Kennecott and other taxpayers. 
Other courts in determining that their escaped assess-
ment statutes do not apply to underassessed property, have stated 
a policy opposing "double taxation". This is considered to be 
the effect of extending an escaped assessment statute to allow 
reassessment, and consequently new taxation, of undervalued prop-
erty. In Tradewell Stores, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 69 Wsh.2d 
352, 418 P.2d 466, 467-68 (Wa. 1966) the Washington Supreme Court 
states as follows: 
In Hammond Lumber Co. v. Cowlitz County, 84 
Wash. 462, 147 P. 19 (1985), the assessor had 
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levied taxes based on the value of the land 
but had neglected to include a railroad built 
on the property. When he attempted to levy 
an "omitted property assessment" to cure this 
oversight, this court ruled that it was not a 
case of assessing omitted property but, 
rather, was double taxation and therefore 
improper. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also characterized an 
attempt to apply Utah's escaped assessment statute to 
underassessed property as being double taxation. See Builders 
Component Supply v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97, 98 
(1969). Indeed, even the County recognizes the application of 
Utah's escaped assessment statute to property which is only 
underassessed to be "double taxation". See Addendum B to this 
Brief, letter from Bill Thomas Peters to Salt Lake County Board 
of Commissioners dated July 20, 1981, at pp. 2 and 3, (Rec. 
729-736). 
Fairness and equity also require that Utah's escaped 
assessment statute be held inapplicable to undervalued property, 
as opposed to escaped or omitted property. It is not fair to 
require Kennecott to challenge its assessment within ten days 
after it is received, see Utah Code Ann. SS 59-5-52 and 59-7-12, 
1953 as amended, and to require the Commission to correct any 
errors it makes in an assessment within eight months of the date 
it assesses the property, see Utah Code Ann. SS 59-5-46(22), 
59-5-52 and 59-10-36(1), 1953 as amended, and yet allow the 
County five years, under the guise that undervaluation 
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constitutes escaped assessment, to complain about, or challenge 
an assessment. 
For the foregoing reasons, sound public policy requires 
that underassessed property not be subject to an escaped assess-
ment merely because it is undervalued. 
POINT II 
THE COUNTY'S COUNTERCLAIM IS FORECLOSED 
BECAUSE THE RELIEF SOUGHT IS UNTIMELY UNDER 
UTAH'S ASSESSMENT SCHEME. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1974) requires the Commission 
to assess all mines and mining claims, all machinery used in min-
ing and all improvements to the surface of mines. This is to be 
accomplished by the Tax Commission before the first day of April 
of each year. See Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-52, 1953 as amended. 
Immediately after this assessment, the owner of the property is 
to be notified of that assessment. Id. 
Thereafter, if an owner of property which is assessed 
by the Commission is dissatisfied with the assessment, he may 
apply to the Commission to have that assessment corrected, so 
long as the application is submitted before the tenth day of 
April. See Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-12, 1953, supra. If no assess-
ment protest is filed with the Commission within this time frame, 
the assessment becomes final and a later assertion in a lawsuit 
that the assessment was improper is foreclosed. See Crystal Car 
Line v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984, 991 
(1946). 
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The basis and thrust of the County's Counterclaim is 
that it is entitled to additional taxes from Kennecott because 
Kennecott's property was allegedly underassessed in 1981 and for 
four years prior thereto. Yet the County did not protest 
Kennecott's assessment before the Commission under Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-7-12, supray as Kennecott was required to do had Kennecott 
desired to protest that assessment. Certainly, if Kennecott is 
required to protest its assessment to the Commission in order to 
have Kennecott's property reassessed, then the County should also 
be required to proceed in the same manner if it desires to have 
Kennecott's property assessed at a higher level so as to collect 
additional taxes. 
POINT III 
THE COUNTY MAY NOT HAVE KENNECOTT'S PROPERTY 
WHICH IS ASSESSED UNDER A NET PROCEEDS METHOD 
REASSESSED BECAUSE THE ASSESSED VALUE IS NOT 
TO ITS LIKING. 
The County alleges that Kennecott's mining claims were 
undervalued for 1981 and four years prior thereto as a result of 
the net proceeds assessment of Kennecott's mining property by the 
Commission under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, 1953 as amended. The 
County then asserts it should be allowed to have these mining 
claims reassessed according to a mysterious formula the County 
has devised which does not comply with the requirements for 
assessment of mines specified in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, 1953, 
as amended. 
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There is no allegation by the County that the assess-
ment of Kennecott's mining claims and mining property was accom-
plished in any fashion other than that specified in those stat-
utes relating to the assessment of mines under the net annual 
proceeds formula. See Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57 et. sea., supra. 
The 'County's counterclaim is that the assessment of Kennecott's 
mining claims under the net annual proceeds formula results in 
what the County considers to be an underassessment because this 
net annual proceeds assessment produces an inappropriate value. 
The County ignores Article XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitu-
tion in raising this point, which specifies as follows: 
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, 
both placer and rock in place, shall be 
assessed as the Legislature shall provide; 
but the basis and multiple now used in deter-
mining the value of metalliferous mines for 
taxation purposes and the additional assessed 
value of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be 
changed before January 1, 1935, nor thereaf-
ter until otherwise provided by law. 
This provision requires that Kennecott's mine be 
assessed according to the net proceeds formula. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in construing this constitutional provision, and the stat-
ute implementing that provision which was the predecessor to the 
current net proceeds formula found in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, 
et. seq., supra, stated in Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah 
County. 80 Utah 491, 15 P.2d 633 (1932), as follows: 
The constitution indicated general principles 
specifying what the general assessments 
should be, but did not lay down rules by 
means of which those principles became effec-
tive. This was left to the legislature. 
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There is a limitation in the constitution to 
the effect that all metalliferous mines or 
mining claims can be assessed only on the 
basis of a value, in addition to $5.00 an 
acre, to be determined by multiplying the 
amount of the net annual proceeds by some 
multiple to be fixed by the Legislature, 
This necessarily limits the legislative power 
to an assessment of mines and mining claims 
as provided in the constitution. There is no 
express limitation to prevent the Legislature 
from making the constitution effective by 
providing a method by which the assessment 
may be made as applied to the basis specified 
in the constitution. 
Id. 15 P.2d 636 [emphasis added]. 
Thus, all metalliferous mines and mining claims may 
only be assessed as specified in the constitution and as provided 
by the legislature. In other words, neither this court, nor the 
County may change the method of assessment specified in Article 
XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and in Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-5-57, et. seq., supra. 
The thrust of the County's complaint in its counter-
claim relating to the assessment of Kennecott's ore in the ground 
is that application of the net annual proceeds formula found at 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, et seq. , supraf by the Commission to 
Kennecott resulted in Kennecott's ore having no value for some of 
the years in question. Again, this is not an argument that 
Kennecott's property escaped assessment, rather the allegation is 
that the value resulting from application of the net proceeds 
formula constitutes underassessment. This allegation fails to 
recognize that under certain circumstances, which the Utah 
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Legislature acknowledged in enacting Utah Code Ann. 59-5-57, 
supra, Kennecott's and other mining companies' unextracted miner-
als will not have positive value. 
Additionally, this assertion is misleading. The County 
would like this court to believe that Kennecott paid no taxes on 
its property during some of the years in question. Kennecott 
paid substantial taxes in each of the years from 1979 through 
1981. In fact, Kennecott paid more taxes than any other taxpayer 
in the County during each of those years. 
In Rio Alqom the court recognized, when it upheld the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5, 1953 as amended, 
that different types of properties require different valuation 
and assessment methodologies. See Rio Alqomf 681 P.2d 188-89, 
where the court states: 
Because of the many different kinds of 
property and the various factors that affect 
their values, the determination of what con-
stitutes equal "in proportion to the value of 
his, her or its tangible property," under 
Article XIII, S 3, cannot be made by applica-
tion of any single formula. 
Of primary importance is the determina-
tion of what valuation methods should be uti-
lized, and that depends on the nature of the 
properties to be taxed. Residential, commer-
cial, transportation, mining, and public 
utilities, etc., must be treated differently 
because of the economic conditions that give 
value to such properties. Some properties 
are income-producing; some are not. Some 
types of property sell frequently in an open 
market and have a market value that may be 
reasonably estimated on the basis of compara-
ble market sales; some types of property are 
rarely sold and have no ascertainable market 
value based on comparable sales. The value 
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of some properties may be strongly influenced 
by general economic or market conditions, 
while others are not. Some may be "wasting 
asset" type properties (such as mines and oil 
and gas properties), while most are not. 
Indeed, some properties may have a value that 
is peculiar to the owner and to no one else. 
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938 (1952) 
(where the issue was the valuation of a mine 
dump). 
The court has also clearly acknowledged that the net 
proceeds method of assessing mining claims is permissible and 
constitutional under Utah's constitution. In United States S.R. 
& M. Co. v. Haynes, 111 Utah 172, 181, 176 P.2d 622 (1947), the 
court stated: 
It is conceded that the statutory method of 
valuing metalliferous mines for taxation pur-
poses at $5 per acre plus a multiple or 
sub-multiple of the net proceeds is a proper 
and constitutional formula for determining 
the value of the mines for assessment 
purposes. 
The County believes the assessed value of Kennecottfs 
mine and mining claims is insufficient even though that assessed 
value was arrived at by proper application of a constitutional 
assessment method mandated by the legislature in Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-5-57 et. seg., supra. Simply speaking, this does not consti-
tute sufficient grounds to have Kennecott's property revalued and 
reassessed as having "escaped assessment." 
The County argues that in the years prior to 1983 the 
Commission rolled back the value of Kennecott's real property to 
its 1978 level in contradiction to the statute specifying a 1978 
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roll back which was, at the time, found at Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-5-109, 1953 as amended. That statute mandated that all real 
property that was revalued after January 1, 1978, was to be 
appraised at its current fair market value and the value of that 
property rolled back to the January lf 1978 level. In interpret-
ing the application of this section to property assessed by the 
Commission, the Commission took the position that it revalued all 
property assessed by it each year and that therefore, the value 
of the property assessed by the Commission was to have its value 
rolled back to the January 1, 1978 level. See Memorandum to Mark 
K. Buchi, Chairman, State Tax Commission of Utah, from Gary R. 
Thorup, Assistant Utah Attorney General, dated October 18, 1983. 
Rec. 833-41. Under this interpretation of the roll back statute 
the Commission rolled back the value of Kennecott's property to 
its January 1, 1978 level. At issue in this lawsuit is the 
assessment of Kennecott's property through January 1, 1981. No 
years after January 1, 1981 are at issue. The Commission acted 
properly in the method by which it assessed Kennecott's property 
for the years in question. 
As is amply pointed out in this Brief, the allegation 
by the County is not that Kennecott's property was not assessed 
at all, but that Kennecott's property was undervalued and 
underassessed as a result of the application of the roll back in 
1981 and the years prior thereto. Clearly, under Point I above, 
the escaped assessment statute relied upon by the County does not 
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apply and may not properly be used to have Kennecott's property 
revalued for the years in question. Under those cases submitted 
by Kennecott as well as the County's Opinion as set out in Adden-
dum "B" attached to this Brief, Utah's escaped assessment statute 
does not permit reassessment of Kennecott's property. 
Kennecott's property is entitled to be assessed under 
Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Utah Constitution upon 
the same basis and in the same fashion as is all other property 
in Utah. In assessing Kennecott's property, the Commission did 
nothing more than apply its understanding of the uniform and 
equal clauses of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Con-
stitution so as to roll back the value of Kennecott's property to 
its 1978 level as was done for all other real property in Utah 
during the same period of time. Under Moon Lake Electrical Assn. 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 384, 345 P.2d 612 (1959), 
this is a correct and proper interpretation of the Commission's 
role in enforcing the tax laws of the State of Utah. 
It is ironic that the County is asserting that 
Kennecott's mining claims were undervalued and that Article XIII, 
Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution require that the court 
ignore Article XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and 
increase the value of Kennecott's mining property under some mys-
tical formula. On the other hand, the County asserts that Arti-
cle XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution simply do not 
apply to the Commission's assessment of Kennecott's other 
-25-
property so as to compel a roll back to that property's 1978 
level* This is inconsistent and an improper reading of the Utah 
Constitution. The County is asking the court to increase the 
value of Kennecott's property in one instance as a result of 
Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution, and yet, 
not to allow a reduction in value of Kennecott's property by 
operation of those same constitutional provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
As is demonstrated above, underassessment does not con-
stitute escaped, or omitted, assessment giving rise to a right by 
the County to reassess Kennecott's property in 1977, 1978, 1979, 
1980 and 1981 under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17 (1974). Further-
more, because the County, and the County assessor, are not the 
assessor of Kennecott's property, neither the County or the 
County assessor may invoke Utah's escaped assessment statute so 
as to compel a reassessment of Kennecott's property. Only the 
Commission, as the assessor of Kennecott's property, has that 
authority. Additionally, because the County did not challenge 
Kennecott's assessment by the Commission under Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-7-12, 1953 as amended, in any of the years in question, the 
County is now foreclosed from such a challenge as a counterclaim 
in a Utah Code Ann. S 59-11-11, 1953 as amended, tax protest 
lawsuit* 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as others stated in 
the body of this brief, the decision of Judge Hanson granting 
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Kennecott and the Commission Summary Judgment should be 
sustained. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /&^dav of J k ^ ^ C - . 
1987. 
4t*^2 g ^ »(£ 
JAMES B. LEE 
CENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
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•Mb 2 5 1936 
J T
 WELLER 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 84-18-1600 
Serial No. 22-27-306-002 
V^5 
A Formal Hearing was held on this matter on October 
23, 1985, James E. Harward conducted the matter with 
Commissioner Roger O. Tew of the Utah State Tax Commission 
presiding. Bill Thomas Peters appeared representing the 
Respondent. Wayne Petty appeared representing the Petitioner, 
At the outset the Petitioner requested that the 
Request for Admissions numbers 1 through 7 and Answers to 
Interrogatories 1 through 5, 11, 12 and 13 be admitted into 
evidence. 'The Petitioner then presented testimony of Helen 
Watson, Deputy Salt Lake County Assessor of the following: 
1. A portion of the subject property was sold 
necessitating a change in the legal description on the county 
records. 
.Appeal No. 84-18-16^ 
2. During the change of the legal description a 
typographical error occurred whereby 9.6070 was transposed into 
6.607 acres. This occurred approximately April 26, 1983. 
3. The Petitioner subsequently told the county 
appraiser that the tax assessment notice was incorrect. 
4. The evidence was presented that a note was made 
and the correction process began to take place on the 
appropriate county record. 
5. Another witness testified that the value for ad 
valorem purposes is computed by multiplying the acreage listed 
on the building card times the value per acre which value is 
then used for computing the assessed value and ultimately the 
tax. The number of acres used to compute the property tax for 
the 1984 tax year was 6.607 rather than the actual 9.6070. 
6. Evidence was further presented that there is no 
dispute as to the value, per acre, of the ground. 
FINDINCS OF FACTS 
1. The tax year in question is 1984. 
2. The lien date for determination of value for the 
tax year is January 1, 1984. 
3. The lien date of the subject property on the 
building cards from which value is established for assessment 
purposes showed 6.6070 acres of ground. The 6.6070 acres of 
ground was then multiplied by the value per acre of $30,500 
arriving at a market value. 
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4. In reality, the ground was 9.607 acres which 
resulted in a total of 3 acres which were not multiplied by 
$30,500 to arrive at the fair market value for January 1, 1984 
of the property. 
5. Such a clerical error resulted in property which 
was undervalued. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The County has the authority to assess escaped 
property at anytime within 5 years ending on the date of 
discovery of the property which has escaped assessment. (Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-5-17; Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan 
County, 230 P. 1020 (Utah 1924)). 
2. The Assessor with the consent of the County 
Commissioners has the authority to correct omissions, errors or 
defects in form in the assessment book when it can be 
ascertained what was intended at any time prior to the sale for 
delinquent taxes and after the original assessment was made. 
(Utah Code Ann. §59wn_3 (1953)). Procedures to correct 
errors, omissions or defects are contained in the Utah Code 
Ann. S 59-7-1 et seq. 
3. Propetty which has been undervalued due to a 
clerical mistake in the quantity of the property to be assessed 
or in the assessed valuation does not result in the property 
which has escaped valuation. (See, Builders Components Supply 
Company v. Cockayne, 450 P.2d 97 (Utah 1969); Tradewell Stores 
Appeal No. 84-18-161 
Inc. v. Snovhomish County, 418 P.2d 466 (Wash. 1968); Leyh v. 
Glass, 508 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1973); People ex. rel. Schuler v. 
Chapman, 19 N.E.2d 351 (111 1939); and Chicago Gravel Company 
v. Rosewell, 455 N.E.2d 120, afjjd, 469 N.E.2d 1098 (111. 
1983)). 
4. Because this is not escaped property, there has 
been a failure of the Respondent to comply with the 
reassessment provisions of the Utah Code. 
5. Because the error in the number of acres which 
resulted in undervaluing the property was discovered 
subsequent to the time the tax was levied and paid by the 
Petitioner, the Board of Equalization cannot now go back and 
assess 3 acres as if they were escaped property. 
FINAL DECISION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the Decision of the 
Utah State Tax Commission that: 
1. Three acres of the subject property did not 
escape assessment for the tax year January 1, 1984, but were 
undervalued. 
2. The action of the Salt Lake County Assessor was 
improper in assessing the property and giving notice thereon. 
3. The action of the County Board of Equalization 
denied Petitioner of due process and equal protection of the 
lav. 
Therefore, the Decision of the Salt Lake County Board 
of Equalization is reversed 
kppeal No. 84-18.-161 
DATED this g^7. day of 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
ABSENT 
Mark K. Buchi 
Chairman 
Rofle^ /O. Tew 
Commissioner 
'Joe B. Pacheco * 
Commissioner 
* Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner 
Gary C. Cornia has been replaced by Commissioner Joe B. 
Pacheco. Commissioner Pacheco has been duly advised of the 
facts and circumstances regarding this case and is qualified to 
sign this decision. 
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TED CANNON 
County Attorney 
Administration 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Suite C-220 
Salt Lake City.Utah 84111 
(801) 363-7900 
July 20, 1981 
S . . i « 9 6 , , ' ' 
ROGER LIVINGSTON 
Chief Deputy Couniy Attorney 
Honorable Board of County Commissioners 
Room 407, City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ATTN: William E. Dunn, Chairman 
RE: Reassessment of Properties for Prior Years -
Brown Subdivision, e^ al. 
Dear Commissioners: 
This opinion is written in response to numerous 
inquiries concerning the actions of the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's Office in assessing back taxes to properties that 
had been previously assessed and the taxes have been paid 
but in a subsequent year they were determined to be inac-
curate. 
In reassessing these properties previously 
assessed, the Salt Lake County Assessor was moving under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-17, which 
sets forth in specificity the duties of the Assessor when he 
discovers a piece of property which has "escaped 
assessment." At the present time, the writer is unaware of 
any Utah cases directly answering the question. However, 
there are Utah cases which do reflect the attitudes of the 
Court in similar situations and based upon those decisions 
it is the conclusion of this Office that once an assessment 
has been made, the taxes levied and the monies paid, the 
Assessor is without tne authority to reassess the property 
as having been f,escaped.H 
In the Utah Supreme Court Case of Builders 
Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 450 P2d 97 (Utah-1969) 
the Utah Supreme Court said that "Statutes imposing taxes 
and prescribing tax procedures should generally be construed 
favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing 
authority" reconizing that this is a long understood policy.. 
That Court went on to state that "...where a valid 
assessment has been made, by an assessor, cognizant of the 
1 
Hon. Board of County Commissioners 
July 20, 1981 
facts, undervaluation is ordinarily not a ground for another 
assessment; and that property should not be subject to 
double taxation.* It has been early held that property is 
not open to back assessment if it was merely assessed at too 
low a value or in the wrong county. . See Anniston City Land 
Co. v. State, 64 So 110 (Ala-1913); State v. Reality Loan 
Co., 96 So 613 (Ala-1923) and Thomas Executrix v. 
Commonwealth, 215 SW2d 546 (Ky-1948). On the other hand, 
clerical errors such as omitting the final zero in calcu-
lating the tax or misplacing a decimal point that results in 
a substantial portion of the property escaping taxation can, 
under certain circumstances trigger a back assessment. See 
Heuck v. Cincinnati Model Homes, 199 NE 698 (Ohio-1936). 
Since the state of.Utah has not decided the 
question directly, it is necessary to review the interpreta-
tive decisions of some of the other States that have statu-
tes similar to the Utah Statute. In the case of Davidson v. 
Franklin Avenue Investment, Co., 151 NW 538 (Minn-1915), the 
Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota was required to 
interpret a statute that is quite similar to the one found 
in Utah Code Annotated, 59-5-17. That case involved a fact 
situation similar to the .one in the instant case. In that 
case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that •...this 
statute gives no power to reassessr except where. Teal.pro-
perty is omitted in~ the -assessment of "any year or years and 
thereby escapes taxation.' * This is not a case-of omitting 
property in an assessment, but simply of undervaluing it.* 
Without mention of the word "reassessment" this Court said 
that it authorizes a reassessment only when the property has 
been omitted, when it has escaped taxation. The words 
"escaped taxation11 or "escaping assessment" appear both in 
the Utah Statute and the Minnesota Statute. The Minnesota 
Court, in that decision, went on to say that to hold other-
wise "...when property has been undervalued by the assessing 
officers, but has paid the taxes assessed and levied, would 
often work a hardship upon innocent purchasers of the 
property." This position was also restated by the 
California Supreme Court in the case of Stafford v. 
Riverside County. 318 P2d 172 (Cal-1957). In that case, the 
assessor attempted to reassess property previously assessed 
for the tax year of 1949, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54. The pro-
perty had been improved for the years 1947, 48 and 49 and 
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the improvements were "well-known to the county assessor" 
and were open and apparent to anyone. However, in 1954, the 
assessor attempted to go back and collect additional taxes. 
The county assessor was moving under a provision similar to 
the one found in the Utah Statute which gave him the 
authority to assess property that had escaped assessment. 
The California Supreme Court reviewed the authorities from 
the various states including the Minnesota case of Davidson 
v. Franklin, supra, and made the following observations 
"From the authorities cited, it would appear that it is only 
where there has been no assessment at all that the provi-
sions for escaped assessment apply." The Court then went on 
to conclude that since the property had been previously 
assessed, although undervalued, it could not be reassessed 
as property having escaped assessment. 
Thus, we see that the California Supreme Court, in 
the case of Stafford, like the Minnesota Court in the case 
of Davidson, has concluded that the word "escaped" or 
"omitted" does .not mean the same thing as "undervalued." " 
It should be pointed out, however, that the 
assessor's action in the instant case is not without sup-
porting authority. In fact, in a more recent California 
decision* the Supreme Court of California appeared to over-
turn the .previous-position .taken -£y~rit in Stafford-." Thus, 
in the case of - Bauer-Schweitzer Mal=t,' Inc. v. City and 
County of "San Francisco, 506 P.2d 1019 (Cal-1973) the 
Supreme Court of the State of California allowed the 
assessor to reassess property undervalued in previous years. 
However, that case arose out of a situation in San Francisco 
County wherein a grand jury had determined that the 
Assessor's Office had deliberately assessed certain proper-
ties below the applicable assessment ratio for the area and 
had done so intentionally and was charged with criminal 
misconduct in office. 
In that case, the California Supreme Court 
restricted its previous holding in the Stafford Case and 
said that, to the extent the property has been assessed at 
an assessment ratio lower than the ratio properly 
established by the assessor for a particular year, such pro-
perty had escaped assessment. The court went on to conclude 
3 
Hon. Board of County Commissioners 
July 20, 1981 
that there was authority to make an escape assessment in the 
amount of the deficiency for any year for which recovery of 
back taxes was permitted by law. This latest pronouncement 
by California Supreme Court would certainly appear to sup-
port the actions of the Salt Lake County Assessor in the 
instant case* As was pointed out by the California Supreme 
Court "The Assessor is under a duty not to allow anyone to 
escape a just and equal assessment." And was further 
observed by the Court, the Assessor is obligated "Not to 
allow anyone to escape a just and equal assessment through 
favor, reward or otherwise." 
As can be seen from the above and foregoing 
authorities, there is no concensus of opinion concerning 
what constitutes escaped or omitted property and what 
constitutes reassessment. And, while it is admitted that 
the Minnesota statute referred to by the Court In the 
Davidson case is not exactly like the Utah statute, the 
thrust of the statute seems to be substantially the same. 
While the Utah statute does not use the word "omitted" and 
simply refers to "escaped assessment," it is my "opinion that 
the intent of both statutes is substantially the same. It 
is further my opinion that the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, while not directly in point, 
would indicate that-the.Utah Supreme Court would probably 
follow the Minnesota court's approach. 
Reference is made to the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Case of Union Portland Cement Co. v. 
Morgan County, 230 P. 1020, in that case our Supreme Court 
declared that "it is the duty of the Assessor ...to assess 
property omitted from assessment when discovered." (Emphasis 
supplied). The fact that this word has been used in 
construing Utah Code Annotated 59-5-17 is further persuasion 
of the fact that the Utah .Supreme Court would probably 
construe the language of 59-5-17 to mean the same as the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota construed the Davidson case. See 
also Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Ditchforth, 243 NW.292, 
wherein the Iowa Supreme Court held that property erro-
neously assessed with respect to the amount was not 
•omitted" or "withheld, overlooked or for any other cause 
not listed and assessed;" hence the County Treasurer could 
not make the correction. Again, the statute in question in 
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t h a t case contained the words "omitted proper ty ." This 
p o s i t i o n i s fu r the r supported by the Supreme Court of the 
S t a t e of Arizona and the Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington. 
In Leyh v. Glass , 508 P.2d 259, the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma made the following observat ion: "Statutory pro-
cedures for l i s t i n g and assess ing omitted property is not 
appropr i a t e for reassess ing or revaluing property which has 
a l ready been assessed . " And in Tradewell S tores , Inc . v. 
Snohomish County, 418 P*2d 466, the Washington Supreme Court 
held t h a t under a s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g to Omitted assessments, 
inappropr ia te va lua t ions may not be increased and the pro-
p e r t y must have been omitted e n t i r e l y as evidenced by the 
assessment r o l l s before taxes for the pas t years may be 
a s se s sed . (Emphas.is supp l i ed ) . The Washington Court went 
on to cha rac t e r i ze such an approach as a double taxation 
ques t ion as has Utah, in the Builder Components case, supra; 
and said tha t the fact " . . . t h a t t h i s in t e rp re t a t ion allows a 
t ax payer to escape payment of taxes as a result; of e r ror or 
ove r s igh t of the a s sesso r , or even because of his i n a b i l i t y 
t o keep cons tan t ly informed of new construct ion in his 
county i s unfor tuna te , but i s immater ia l ." 
Based upon the foregoing a u t h o r i t i e s and a l i t e r a l 
reading of the-prov is ions of Ut3h Code Annotated, Section 
5 9-^5-17.
 f~ and "based "upon the previous opinion issued by th i s 
o f f i c e , i t i s . s t i l l the opinion, of t h i s office that once an 
assessment has been made upon proper ty , and the taxes have 
been pai^d, i t would be inappropr ia te and unlawful for the 
Assessor to at tempt to change the assessment by t r ea t ing 
sa id previously assessed property as escaped property and 
move under Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-17, 1953, as 
amended. On the other hand, if the e r ro r i s discovered 
p r i o r to the time tha t the taxes are delinquent or have been 
pa id , the Assessor has the au tho r i t y to correc t such e r r o r s . 
This au tho r i t y i s found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
59-11-3 , 1953, as amended, which s t a t u t o r y provision allows 
the Assessor to make ce r t a in cor rec t ions in the assessment 
book for e r r o r s or omissions. The p e r t i n e n t language of 
t h a t s t a t u t e reads as fol lows: 
"Omissions, e r r o r s or defec ts in form in the 
assessment book, when i t can be ascertained 
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therefrom what was intendedf may, with the consent 
of the County Commission, be supplied or corrected 
by the Assessor at any time prior to the sale for 
delinquent taxes and after the original assessment 
was made/ (Emphasis supplied). 
As previously indicated, this statute would appear to allow 
a correction or a reassessment of property that was erro-
neously assessed if the discovery of the error occurred 
prior to the time that the property became subject to sale 
for delinquent taxes. This would, therefore, mean that if 
an erroneous assessment is made and the taxes have, in fact, 
not been paid and the error is discovered pribr to the sale 
for delinquent taxes to the County, a correction could be 
made. However, in those cases where the underassessment was 
not discovered until after the time that the taxes were paid 
or that the sale to the County had taken place, the authori-
ties from a majority of the states having statutes similar 
to the Utah Statute would not allow a subsequent assessment. 
I should also like to mention in passing that in 
the instant case, and in particular with the Brown 
Subdivision, the Salt Lake County Assessor was acting pur-
suant to preliminary advice given by the undersigned as 
Special Deputy County Attorney. That advice was .based pri-
marily -.upon the. fact* :that the SupremeMTourt ~of. the State of r 
Cali'fbrniaY in-approaching a similar-.problem,- had-drasti-
cally changed from its previous position and had allowed the 
assessor to make reassessment for previously undervalued 
property in subsequent years. This is the position set 
forth in the Schweitzer-Malt case. However, upon more 
detailed review and upon further review of the authorities 
and a re-examination of the two Utah cases that would appear 
to have a bearing on the question, it is the opinion of the 
undersigned that the Utah Court would not allow a subsequent 
reappraisal of property previously assessed upon which the 
taxes had been paid. While the actions of the Salt Lake 
County Assessor were certainly in the best interests and 
welfare of all taxpayers in Salt Lake County and were geared 
towards assuring that each and every taxpayer in the County 
pays their just and fair share of the tax burden, it is also 
apparent that, under the facts and circumstances of this 
case, the action would probably not be supportable. 
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Therefore, the opinion of this Office is that those 
reassessments made by the Assessor's Office for the year 
1981 of properties previously assessed but undervalued where 
the taxes had been paid or where a preliminary sale to Salt 
Lake County had taken place, should be cancelled, at least 
to the extent that they relate to prior years. Of course, 
any corrective action taken for the year 1981 is supportable 
and can be taken until such times as the taxes are in fact 
paid or the property is preliminarily sold to Salt Lake 
County for non-payment of taxes. 
If there are any additional questions with regard 
to this matter, please do not hesitate to contact the under-
signed. 
Best personal regards, 
Ted Cannon, 
S a l t Lake County At torney 
B y : <~—sJ-S .- S~s~.**</>' -'f\^'.t 
r ; .B i l l Thomas:.Peters--.-
. S p e c i a l Deputy -Salt Lake 
County At torney 
hw 
cc: Donald S. Savava 
ADDENDUM C 
59-5-17 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
59-5-17. Property escaping assessment—Five-year limitation period on 
assessment—Duties of assessor.—Any property discovered by the assessor 
to have escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far back as five 
years prior to the time of discovery, and the assessor shall enter such 
assessments on the tax rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or else-
where, and when so assessed shall be reported by the assessor to the county 
auditor, if made after the assessment book has been delivered to the county 
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the county assessor with the taxes 
on such property, and the assessor shall give notice to the person assessed 
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to secure or collect the 
taxes as provided in chapter 10 of this title. 
EQUALIZATION 59-7-12 
59-7-12. Time for application to correct assessment.—If the owner of 
any property assessed by the state tax commission is dissatisfied with the 
assessment made by it, such owner may, between the third Monday in May 
and the second Monday in June, apply to the commission to have the same 
corrected in any particular, and it shall set a time for hearing such objec-
tions and may correct and increase or lower any assessment made by it, so 
as to equalize the same with the assessment of other ptopeTty in the state. 
59-2-803. Statement transmitted 'by county auditors to 
governing bodies. 
The county auditor shall transmit to the governing bodies of cities, towns, 
schools, and other taxing districts in which the property is situated, or to 
which any of the value is apportioned, a statement of the valuation of all 
property as fixed and apportioned by the commission and reported under 
§ 59-2-802. The statement shall be transmitted at the same time and in the 
same manner as the statement is transmitted under § 59-2-924. All the prop-
erty is taxable upon assessment at the same rate, by the same officers, and for 
the same purposes, as the property of individuals within the city, town, school, 
road, or other taxing districts, respectively, and the taxes, except the taxes on 
car companies and on automobiles, motor stages, and motor transports, shall 
be collected in the same manner and by the same officers as the other taxes 
are collected. 
ADDENDUM D 
AKT. XIII, § 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Bee' 2. [Tangible property to be taxed—Value ascertained—Properties 
exempt—Legislature to provide annual tax for state.] 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The property of the state, 
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public 
libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious 
worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for 
private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. Tangible per-
sonal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is held for sale or 
processing and which is shipped to final destination outside this state with-
in twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no situs in Utah 
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law 
from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or other-
wise originating within or without the state. Tangible personal property 
present in Utah on January 1, m., held for sale in the ordinary course 
of business and which constitutes the inventory of any retailer, or whole-
saler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may be deemed 
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. "Water 
rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, trans-
mission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or cor-
porations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals 
or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall not be separately 
taxed so long as they shall be owned and used exclusively for such 
purposes. Power plants, power transmission lines and other property 
used for generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which 
is used for furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes 
on lands in the state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the 
extent that such nrooertv is used for such purposes. These exemptions 
shall accrue to the benefit of the users of water so pumped under such 
regulations as the Legislature may prescribe. The taxes of the indigent 
poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The Legislature may provide for the exemption from 
taxation of homes, homesteads, and personal property, not to exceed $2,000 
in value for homes, homesteads, and all household furnishings, furniture, 
and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in 
maintaining a home for himself and family. Property not to exceed $3,000 
in value, owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the 
military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the 
unmarried widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of 
persons who while serving in the military service of the United States 
or the state of Utah were killed in action or died as a result of such 
iervice may be exempted as the Legislature may provide. 
The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any 
there be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, suffi-
cient to pay the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, 
within twenty years from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
(As amended November 4, 1930; November 5, 1946; November 4, 1958, 
effective January 1, 1959; November 6, 1962, effective January 1, 1963; 
November 3, 1964, effective January 1, 1965; November 5, 196S, effective 
January 1,1969.) 
ART. XIII, § 3 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property—Exemptions-
Personal income tax—Disposition of revenues.] 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the state[,] accord-
ing to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations 
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such proprrty, so that 
every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value 
of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the Legislature may 
determine the manner and extent of taxing transient livestock and livestock 
being fed for slaughter to be used for human consumption. Land used 
for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, be assessed 
according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the value it 
may have for other purposes. Intangible property may be exempted from 
taxation as property or it may be taxed in such manner and to such extent 
as the Legislature may provide. Provided that if intangible property be 
taxed as property the rate thereof shall not exceed five mills on each 
dollar of valuation. "When exempted from taxation as property, the taxable 
income therefrom shall be taxed under any tax based on incomes, but when 
taxed by the state of Utah as property, the income therefrom shall not 
also be taxed. The Legislature may provide for deductions, exemptions, 
and/or offsets on any tax based upon income. The personal income tax 
rates shall be graduated but the maximum rate shall not exceed six per 
cent of net income. No excise tax rate based upon income shall exceed four 
per cent of net income. The rate limitations herein contained for taxes 
based on income and for taxes on intangible property shall be effective 
until January 1, 1937, and thereafter until changed by law by a vote 
of the majority of the members elected to each house of the Legislature. 
All revenue received from taxes on income or from taxes on intangible 
property shall be allocated to the support of the public school system as 
defined in Article X, Section 2 of this Constitution. (As amended November 
6, 1900; November 6,1906; November 4,1930; November 5,1946; November 
5, 196S, effective January 1, 1969.) 
